Why Montecito’s Nets Got Das’ Boot
Have we no memory?
Have we no leadership?
Who in our local government is representing the interests of Montecito residents?
Are we considered too privileged to merit concern?
When the debris nets on the mountains above Montecito were taken down on November 1, I was beside myself. As photos came in of helicopters lifting the nets off the mountain, I reflected upon all that it took to get them there in the first place…
The worldwide search for resiliency solutions. The months of fundraising. The countless hours of work to get the approvals needed to do something that could give us some protection. The days and weeks and months that followed the 1/9/2018 debris flow. The bungled evacuation process. The tragic loss of life and property. The fear that gripped our community.
Post 1/9/2018 the County was [understandably] overwhelmed. The wheels of government move too slowly to find solutions in the moment of a catastrophic disaster. There was no cavalry coming. Private citizens, with a huge stake in protecting its hometown, could only count on themselves to come up with solutions.
And so, The Partnership for Resilient Communities was born (TPRC). Full disclosure, I was originally part of that group. For legal reasons the name was changed to The Project for Resilient Communities. But at the time no one grasped the poetry of losing that single word: Partnership.
TPRC found the ring nets, used around the world to protect against debris flow disaster. As our naked, fire-scorched mountains slowly began to revegetate, TPRC raised millions of dollars to pay for the nets, the insurance, the necessary bonds. It wrangled the multitudinous approvals from local landowners, county, state and federal agencies, Fish and Wildlife and other environmental groups, to get the emergency permits it needed to install the nets.
The nets were never meant to be a silver bullet, but part of a larger community resiliency plan imperative for us to sleep safely and soundly beneath the beautiful Santa Ynez Mountains.
Initially it was thought that perhaps the nets would only be necessary until our mountains revegetated. What was subsequently learned, unlike what we were initially told after 1/9/18, is that this was not a once in 500 years event or a once in a millennium event. In fact, as an independent study by respected geological engineers Larry D. Gurrola and J. David Rogers showed, debris laden flooding or debris flows have hit the South Coast 42 times since 1820. Often in the same exact locations. TPRC forwarded all that information to First District Supervisor Das Williams and Flood Control two years ago.
When our San Ysidro Net filled on 1/9/2023, exactly five years to the day from the 1/9/2018 event, TPRC felt that its concept of stopping an incipient debris flow high up in the canyons of Montecito had been proven. And apparently, according to an article by Nick Welsh in the Santa Barbara Independent on 1/18/23, Supervisor Williams agreed:
“I don’t know that we know,” said County Supervisor Das Williams – whose district includes Montecito – of the steel nets’ impact during last week’s torrential downpours… But it seems like it was somewhere between successful and very successful.”
Because of this, TPRC kept pushing the County to consider taking over the nets as part of its Flood Control System. TPRC received permission from private landowners to extend the nets on their land until 2029 and began the process to extend its permits.
According to former Santa Barbara City Fire Chief and TPRC Executive Director Pat McElroy, on October 25 of this year, during a Zoom call with County Planning and Development, TPRC was told the County was likely to recommend to the Montecito Planning Commission (MPC) that they extend the permits. That they wanted to schedule a hearing with the MPC on November 15 – two weeks after TPRC’s established deadline to decide whether or not to pull the nets.
When TPRC realized that the County was not seriously considering being part of the future of the nets, it made the decision that, however unfortunate, the nets would have to be removed. According to McElroy, TPRC didn’t feel it would be responsible to keep the nets in place if they would be expected to continue raising millions of dollars should the nets fill again. I think it’s fair to ask, should local Montecito residents have to pay, above and beyond our myriad taxes, to keep our town safe?
At last week’s public meeting at Cold Spring School called by County Flood Control, as reported by the Montecito Journal’s Joanne Calitri in this issue [see page 12], County Supervisor Das Williams, in response to a question about the nets being removed, said this:
“First of all, we did not take them down, I personally would like a Buena Vista net in place until the debris basin gets built. We made an offer, the Partnership did not like that offer because it did not include all of the nets. But we are particularly interested in Buena Vista, and we still are in some dialog; I’d love to have one of those nets back, because getting it permitted from the County standpoint is a little bit easier than what they had to go through because we don’t have to issue a permit to ourselves. The challenge would be Fish and Wildlife, and the challenge would be whether it is an opportunity through an emergency permit or whether we would have to go through the normal process, which is a pain as Pat will tell you.”
This statement belies the facts. Supervisor Williams has known for over a year of the specific dates and looming deadlines and the decisions he needed to make, yet he chose to kick the can down the road until it was too late. He panicked on November 1 and began to “Das-plain.”
So what are the facts?
Supervisor Williams is correct. He did not take down the nets. TPRC did. TPRC repeatedly told the County, and it had been made abundantly clear in hundreds of letters sent to the Supervisors by county residents, that unless a deal was made the nets had to be removed by November 15. After the 15th, technically the start of the rainy season, no work could be done in the canyons. No work would be allowed until the end of the season, which is usually May. They were looking at a potential El Niño year with heavier than usual rain.
TPRC had been engaged with the County on two fronts. It was in the process of extending its five-year permits which were due to expire on December 21 of this year, and to explore the possibility of the County taking over management of the nets in the future. The nets were on private land. TPRC had received permission from the landowners to extend its agreement with them for five additional years and had insured the landowners until 2029. The County, in a letter to TPRC supporters, not to TPRC, listed some conditions.
TPRC responded to those conditions in an Executive Summary with 10 attachments. TPRC did not receive a response. TPRC knew its time was running short, so it sent a letter to the Supervisors establishing a deadline of October 30to get either a yes or no on the possibility of the County taking over the net system. After that, TPRC would have no choice but to remove the nets. On October 26, TPRC sent one last term sheet to the County. It was returned with about 80 percent of the text redlined by the County.
The October 30 deadline came and went. On November 1, TPRC’s contractors began the process of removing the nets.
On November 3, TPRC received a text proposal from Supervisor Williams. The nets were already on the ground. The proposal kept almost all the financial responsibility on TPRC. It had not been approved by the Board of Supervisors, had not been vetted by County Counsel nor, to the best of my knowledge, the County CEO.
Please read the letter below sent to the County Board of Supervisors this September by Geomorphologist Engineering Geologist, Larry D. Gurrola, strongly urging them to keep the nets.
And to Supervisor Williams I say this: Montecito needs a County Supervisor that has our back. One who works hard in the calm moments to make sure that we’re okay in the storms. A representative because of whom, not despite whom, we can feel safe. We need a Supervisor who sees us, and values us, and works with us to understand our needs. One who shows up every day. Not just when political pressures build; and not just when an election looms.
Letter from Larry D. Gurrola
Members of the Board of Supervisors,
I am writing to express my deep-seated support for extending the permits of the six debris ring nets installed by The Partnership for Resilient Communities (TPRC) and for the consideration of County of Santa Barbara to take responsibility of all six nets. Six debris nets were installed by TPRC across the west and east forks of Cold Spring, San Ysidro, and Buena Vista creeks as part of the Montecito Emergency Debris Flow Mitigation Project in 2019. It is my opinion that these nets serve as an additional system of debris retention and impede the buildup of debris flows in Montecito’s watersheds before they are discharged out of canyons. By incorporating the nets with existing debris basin mitigation, the County of Santa Barbara will increase the resiliency and public safety of the community of Montecito.
The devastating January, 9, 2018 (1-9) debris flows resulted in 23 fatalities, destroyed over 500 homes, damaged infrastructure including closing Highway 101 for 13 days, caused an estimated $1 billion dollars in damages, and instilled trauma in not only those that experienced the destruction of their community, but also for first responders who were first on the scene to assist victims (Lancaster et al., 2021; County of Santa Barbara OEM, 2018; Kean et al., 2019). The 1-9 event overshadows the 1934 New Year’s Day Montrose debris flow which is generally recognized as the first flood event termed a debris flow. However, the 200-year history of Montecito reveals that the dangers of fire were known 150 years ago to remain long after the fire was extinguished because winter rainfall would discharge destructive logs, trees, and boulders from the steep terrain canyons onto the coastal (alluvial) plain. In fact, native Californios and Native Americans would prepare by clearing the creek channels and move to higher ground not only after fires, but also during high rainfall seasons or intense storms.
Research of Montecito’s 200-year debris flow history established that in addition to the 1-9 debris flow event, four previous large magnitude debris flows were discharged from the Montecito watersheds (Gurrola and Rogers, 2022). It is important to note, that only one of the four events, the 1825 event, occurred in post-fire watershed conditions, the 1861-62, 1914, 1995 events occurred in vegetated conditions and were initiated by atmospheric river events or during intense rainfall in watersheds with high antecedent moisture conditions (due to preceding rainfall). There exists an erroneous perception that the downstream community of Montecito is only dangerous following wildfire and that is one of the contentions the Los Padres Forest Watch alleges. This is simply not the case, and our flood history demonstrates this assumption is completely inaccurate.
The largest of all events, the 1861-62 debris flow and debris laden flood events occurred in vegetated conditions and were massive in scale. The 1-9 event pales in comparison to this event. Debris deposition backed up and filled all existing creek channels at the time, created new creek channels, and resulted in alteration of the Santa Barbara and Montecito landscapes. News accounts describe that acres of terrain, trees, and rock were mobilized in mere seconds as large landslides slid down the steep canyon slopes, only to enter the main canyon drainage where boulders and trees bobbed like corks in floodwaters (i.e., debris flows). Multiple debris flow events were associated with atmospheric river storm events from late December 1861 to February 1862. This scenario occurred again in 1914 when atmospheric river events filled Montecito and Carpinteria creek channels with debris and formed new creek channels, some were over a half of a mile from the original channel. News accounts note that property line changes resulted, so all of the creek channels had to be cleared to be restored. It was noted in news accounts that similar landscape changes occurred in the 1825 and 1862 events where all of the boulders and trees from the mountains were washed onto the coastal plain.
In summary, this study revealed that while post-fire conditions significantly lower the threshold for debris flows, long duration and/or high intensity storm events occurred during high rainfall seasons producing high antecedent moisture conditions. Ultimately, sub-tropical moisture storms (i.e., Pineapple Express storm events) triggered debris charged floods including debris flows and debris laden floods. One highly overlooked phenomenon that has occurred nearly a dozen times in our history, is devastating landslide dam outbreak floods that pose a greater threat than debris flows to the downstream community. One such outbreak flood occurred in the upper tributary of the San Ysidro watershed and carried 30- to 40-foot-long logs to the Coast Highway, which today is the location of Highway 101. Automobiles were washed away from the Coast Highway and carried off to sea never to be found. The 1-9 event did not carry such large debris to the lower fan. Another outbreak flood occurred on a clear night in December 1861 and flooded a vast area below the canyon mouth of Santa Monica Creek in Carpinteria. It only takes one large landslide to form a dam across a canyon drainage. The blockage creates a temporary lake behind the dam, and typically the dam collapses within 24 hours. Outbreak flood flows increase exponentially to peak discharge due to nearly instantaneous discharge of the lake. These catastrophic outbreak floods transition into debris flows and therefore, are more dangerous. If critics think this has only occurred in our past, a recent landslide dam in Ventura in 1998 threatened the City and downstream community. However, it was quickly discovered and oil well roads provided access to the landslide dam and allowed for equipment to pump water out of the temporary lake before it could collapse.
The County of Los Angeles Flood Control is considered by many as the Gold Standard in flood protection which was motivated by the 1934 New Year’s Day debris flows. They utilized debris basins at canyon mouths to capture debris and remove it from the flows, thereby reducing the bulking effect, volume of flows, and removing logs which act as devastating spears and boulders which ram and destroy residential homes. A residential home does not stand a chance against this debris moving at 30 to 35 mph.
The County of Santa Barbara Flood Control has taken action to increase the resilience of the community of Montecito following the 1-9 event and I support and encourage the continued development of additional debris basins. However, the best mitigation strategies do not rely on only one type of mitigation method, they employ multiple methods so there is a redundancy in the protective systems so that if one fails, another type is relied upon. This functional chain strategy serves multiple purposes for reduction of debris flow impacts. Given the historical record of large magnitude of debris flow events that affected the community of Montecito, it is essential that the County incorporates the debris nets into their mitigation strategy, in addition to increasing the debris capacity of existing basins and developing new basins. The 1-9 event revealed the current basin debris retention capacity remains woefully below the potential discharge volume from the watersheds.
Geobrugg, the manufacturer of the debris nets, has installed over 1,500 nets in over 30 countries and is well-respected for their designs and reputation. These types of debris nets have been utilized internationally and have been proven to work protecting downstream communities from the dangers of debris flows. It is important to note that no mammals or fish are documented to have been injured or killed by the nets.
The 2023 report by Cal OES Mission Task #2023-SOC-94072 tallied 1,162 landslides that were produced in the Montecito watersheds as the result of the 2023 atmospheric river events. This study determined that landslides including shallow debris slides transitioned into debris flows which were captured and retained by debris basins. The debris net in upper San Ysidro Canyon captured and retained (a) landslide(s) that transitioned into debris flows and retained the debris as designed. The captured debris that can be seen consists of vegetation and basketball-size boulder debris in addition to finer sediment. Although one criticism mentioned by the Los Padres Watch stated the trapped debris lacks the large boulders that devastated homes in the 1-9 event, we are only observing a small percentage of the total retained debris and had this debris flow not been stopped, it would have entrained large boulder debris from the bottom of the channel and banks and bulked up in size and volume. This is what the nets are designed to do in locations such as the upper San Ysidro Canyon, capture debris flows before they build up. I believe this debris was captured just downstream of its source and the buildup to a larger debris flow was prevented by the nets. Again, the debris net worked as designed capturing and retaining a debris flow and preventing this flow from entraining more debris and increasing in volume.
The two debris nets developed in San Ysidro Creek supplement the debris retention of the San Ysidro and Randall roads debris basins. The recently developed Randall Road basin is a large basin but is located about half mile below the San Ysidro Canyon mouth, so a stretch of creek upstream of the basin remains largely at risk for debris flow inundation and damages. History has established that this area has been repeatedly inundated in the past by debris flows and there remains the possibility that debris flows discharged from the San Ysidro Canyon mouth break out-of-channel upstream of the Randall Road basin and miss entering the basin. Two nets are installed in the East and West Forks of Cold Spring Creek and supplement the Cold Spring basin. The nets in Buena Vista serve as the only mitigation in that canyon and for the downstream community. Removal of the nets will eliminate the only redundancy in the County’s protective measures of debris basins.
It is noted that basins such as the Gobernador debris basin designed with an open outlet concept and the Randall Road basin allow for sediment, gravel, and cobbles to pass downstream. This is an important advantageous aspect to these basins to allow sediment and smaller rock debris to pass and nourish downstream creek environments and beaches. The filled debris net in upper San Ysidro Canyon will be cleared of the debris and sediment and these materials will be redistributed to continue transport downstream.
Former Flood Control director, James Stubchaer, wrote in 1972 that, “…floods in the (Montecito) area pose a severe threat to life and property….” and he also wrote, “Some areas, such as canyon bottoms, areas near the mouths of canyons, areas close to the banks of erosive streams, and certain other high hazard areas should probably not be built on at all.” Mr. Stubchaer clearly noted, “Much of the developable land (in Montecito) is subject to some degree of flood hazard.” He noted that the Montecito watersheds yield very high flood flows and “That these floods typically consist of a wave or series of waves, from 10 to 25 feet high loaded with rocks, trees, and mud, speeding down the canyons demolishing everything in their path.” This scenario is what occurred in the 1-9 event, and occurred four previous times with greater magnitudes and will continue to occur in the future whether the watersheds are in post fire conditions or not.
The deaths of 23 community members are too high of a cost not to do anything. In my opinion, it is necessary to develop additional debris flow structures, both basins and nets, at key locations. Over 1,000 rescues were performed by first responders in the first 24 hours following the 1-9 event (Jackson, 2019). Fortunately, the loss of lives was significantly reduced by the determination of these responders. However, entire neighborhoods were wiped out. Destroyed homes were only evident by the remaining concrete foundations. How many fatalities are an acceptable loss in debris flow events? Are any deaths acceptable? Do we do nothing? We can place a monetary value on the destruction of property and infrastructure, but it is the loss of life that should motivate us to do more. Therefore, I urge the Board of Supervisors to seriously consider taking ownership of the debris nets, continue to develop debris basins at key locations, and keep the community of Montecito and the 23 fatalities in mind, in making such a critical decision.
Respectfully submitted,
Larry D. Gurrola, Ph.D, P.G., C.E.G. Expires 8-31-2024 TPRC Geomorphologist Engineering Geologist
